

Frederick's "Greatness"

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Abstract

This essay attempts to identify the various qualities that made Frederick II of Prussia's just appellation 'the Great'. Frederick employed a completely new type of rule, which was not only unique in the eighteenth century but also prefigured modern governance in many respects. Frederick personified the *raison d'état* and came to exemplify the rational use of state power for the creation of a completely new standard of judicious kingship. As a visionary ruler of his day, Frederick foreshadowed modern principles of the state. To highlight Frederick's innovations, the essay not only shows Frederick's brilliant leadership in the scene of eighteenth-century Europe, but it also refers to rarely quoted contemporary sources; by doing so, the essay contrasts the prodigious divide between the crumbling culture of the *Ancien Régime* and that of Frederick's Prussia—the former still feudal and the latter possessing a vision that rulers are the 'first servants of the state'.

Keywords: Frederick II of Prussia, Eighteenth Century European history, *Raison D'Etat*.

Introduction

Frederick II of Prussia was arguably the most charismatic and successful ruler of the eighteenth century. A revolutionary figure in the realm of policy and warfare—he is credited for having invented *Realpolitik*—he was a fascinating admixture of the most disparate elements; his affability and ruthlessness, for some mysterious reason, did not seem to collide. Infinitely industrious, indefatigable, uniquely available to his people, he remains an inscrutable figure, full of enigmatic contradictions, despite having written the most frank memoirs and confessions of any ruler of the *Ancien Régime*. In his lifetime he provoked a degree of praise that was reserved for nobody else in modern history, except, perhaps, Louis XIV. But while the latter's admirers were exclusively French, Frederick elicited admiration from men all over Europe—even his enemies. We shall see why. A compelling example of this peculiar reverence, which he received early in his reign—since the epithet 'the Great' and 'der Einzige' (the Unique) was given to him after just five years of rule—is in a man of dissatisfaction such as Lord Chesterfield, who, in a letter to his son, said of Frederick that 'he is so great a man that had he lived seventeen or eighteen hundred years ago, we should have talked of him as we do now of your Alexanders, your Caesars, and others [...].' (Chesterfield, 1932, p.2262-3) But Chesterfield carried it even further: in 1752, after having read Voltaire's *Le Siècle de Louis XIV*, Chesterfield wrote to the great 'philosophe' himself, who at the time was staying with Frederick at Berlin, to suggest that he write Frederick's own history: '[...] you have given us lately the history of the greatest King; give us now, the history of the

greatest and most decent man of Europe, whom I degrade in calling him King. You have him everyday before your very eyes, so nothing would be easier; his glory would not require your poetic invention, but would be safely placed by your historical truth.’¹ (Chesterfield, 1932, p.1928)

What was the cause of such veneration? The answer itself is simple: Frederick was a ruler of a completely new sort, the like of which had never been seen, and whose brand of authority had aspects that would not be seen in Europe until the twentieth century. It is these new modes of leadership, which require close scrutiny, and that this paper shall try to examine.

Frederick’s Swift Success

There is evidence that even before his accession, expectations were high for Frederick: his father Frederick William I had left the Prussian state coffers unencumbered by the debt left by his own father, Frederick I, the first King of Prussia, whose prodigality in fashioning himself a foolish copy of Louis XIV had seriously impinged on the state finances. Frederick William had remedied these blunders by constructing an efficient and frugal administration, by establishing a consumer tax, and by encouraging more farming with vast marshland draining. In fact, Frederick William had left his son a rich man. But more importantly, he forged an army 80,000 strong, which was the best-equipped and best-trained army in Europe. An army of this size in a state of just two and a half million inhabitants was remarkable, and went clearly beyond purely defensive needs. Frederick William concentrated all his resources on the militarization of Prussia to such an extent that, ‘The Prussian army [under Frederick William I] had become the core of the state.’ (Ritter, 1968, p.19) In fact, Voltaire’s well-known flippant remark that ‘where some states have an army, the Prussian army has a state!’ was in retrospect not a quip but a literalism.

When Frederick William died on May 31st 1740, the Marquis D’Argenson, member of Louis XV’s privy counsel, wrote in his diary about Frederick’s accession prophetically:

The prince has great intelligence, merit in all directions, much application, and philosophy. *He will do what he has to do.* His rights are of a kind to need war to sustain and strengthen his dawning greatness in the midst of jealous enemies, neighbours who hem him in, and before an oppressing emperor. He will find in the arrangements of his father much opportunity for becoming a great power in Europe. [...] Shall he [Frederick] favour his own party? Shall he profit by it to diminish the power of the Germanic Chief, and to aggrandize himself, the King of Prussia? [...] All his political forces will go to diminishing the vicious power of the Chief of the Germanic body, and making that body thrive on the fragments of its head; which would bring more power, more resistant force, more solidity, and no connivance at any time against the power and grandeur of the House of France. Hence I conclude that the closest alliance of the King of Prussia should be a maxim with us and that he should remain, or become, more our friend than our enemy during his whole reign. (D’Argenson, 1901, p.223-225)

Lord Acton wrote of D’Argenson that ‘there was more divination in him than any other voice in France at that time’ and that ‘D’Argenson heralded events’ (Acton, 2000, p.17). He was not wrong: D’Argenson’s insight reaches just short of prophesying Frederick’s invasion of Silesia, which was to occur—startling less percipient observers—just a few months later.

The invasion of Austrian Silesia in December 1740 is considered by historians a watershed date, since for the first time, the Holy Roman Empire was attacked by one of its own constituents. Its sanctity, it seemed, had been violated irretrievably. In reality, the inviolability of the empire had ceased, at least in theory, back in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia. One of the provisions of the treaty was that sovereign principalities *within* the empire could lend their armies for mercenary purposes to any power, so, theoretically, even against the empire

¹The letter is in French.

itself. This was of course unimaginable in 1648; but the treaty would deal a veritable blow to the hitherto-uncontested preeminence of the Hapsburgs, for it became a matter of time for a potentate to take advantage of the new provision at the expense of the emperor. If we pay close attention to the words of D'Argenson in the same diary entry, we can infer that the challenge to the millenary structure of the *Reich* was up, for more powers than one were vying for its leadership:

To whom will the succession of the empire fall? [...] on the death of the Emperor (which shall happen after a few attacks of apoplexy²), by what pretext of a right of succession can Frederick aggrandize himself without Bavaria and Saxony claiming still more of the spoils, they who have such potent rights to its inheritance? Still, it is to his interest that these two rivals should make themselves powerful at the cost of the Emperor.
(D'Argenson, 1901, p.224)

The problem of the empire's succession had been one that emperor Charles VI had been preparing for since 1713, when, having only produced female heirs, he issued the Pragmatic Sanction, which gave the right of succession to his daughter Maria Theresa. The history of the Pragmatic Sanction is as complex as the empire onto which Charles tried to impose it. With its thousands of principalities and autonomous territories, many remonstrated at becoming vassals of a female: the empire, since its inception in 962 had always followed Salic law, precluding female inheritance. In the case of Prussia, Frederick William I, who had always been faithful to the emperor, accepted the provision; but in the 1720's Charles failed to fulfill some territorial promises and a brief period of alienation followed; it was not a break or a real breach of the king's vassalage toward the emperor—for that was inconceivable to Frederick William—but nevertheless it made him less willing to accept an anomalous provision such as the Pragmatic Sanction, so, for a while he reneged on it. Eventually however, he accepted it along other European powers. But at the death of Charles VI on the 20th of October 1740, Bavaria, Saxony, France, and crucially, Prussia contested Maria Theresa's claims.

The Invasion of Silesia: Its Practical and Symbolic Success

The death of Emperor Charles VI was the excuse Frederick was waiting for. In December he invaded Silesia meeting almost no resistance, partly because Frederick, in a show of his characteristic pragmatism, knew that two thirds of the province were Protestant and detested the Catholic Hapsburg's constant meddling in their religious affairs. 'The whole land rejoices at our arrival,' Frederick wrote to his brother, 'and is only afraid that we shall leave.' (quoted in Gooch, 1947, p.15) In effect, Frederick did have a legitimate claim to Silesia, dating back to 1537, but it was a very loose claim that had never been ratified by Vienna. So despite his assertions to the contrary, Frederick's move was dictated purely by 'reasons of state', for Silesia was the richest province of the Empire; it accounted for 25% of its total revenue, which was mostly due to its profitable textile industry and superior commercial waterways. Frederick's move was so bold that a century later Otto von Bismarck declared that, 'Frederick the Great stole Silesia, yet he is one of the greatest men of all time.' (Gooch, 1947, p.13) The King of Prussia's effrontery was not shocking just to contemporary Austrian observers:

The King of Prussia, before the manifestoes and declarations which usually precede a war, had inundated Silesia with his troops; he admitted it afterwards, when he was assured of his prey. The other belligerent powers had recourse to another method; they covered all Europe with manifestoes, calling heaven as a witness of the justice of their claims on the inheritance of Maria Theresa; then, they took up arms.
(Du Plessis, 1903, p.157)

These words, written in 1741 by the Duc de Richelieu, demonstrate the gulf between Frederick and the majority of men in official posts in the eighteenth century. Richelieu, the

² D'Argenson's astonishing predictive qualities are again manifest in this entry of June 11, 1740 quoted above: emperor Charles VI died two months later.

great-grandson of the famous cardinal, was a good military leader who served valiantly under the Marechal de Saxe in the only unequivocal victory of France under the reign of Louis XV (the battle of Fontenoy in 1745 against Austria and Britain). But despite being a man of action, Richelieu was a man anchored in the past. According to him then, Frederick's annexation of Silesia was brazen if not insolent, which makes the juxtaposition of the new, vigorous, practicality of Frederick against the overly ceremonious and laggard deportment of the French obvious; and it is almost comical to read Richelieu's complaining that Frederick had not announced his Silesian campaign, while Frederick had instead simply—and effectively—done just as D'Argenson had predicted: 'what he has to do.'

Why did Frederick invade Silesia and what did it really mean? We have already looked at the symbolic meaning of this act. But what just seems to be a mere act of aggression, actually discloses Frederick's greatest quality, which made him an incomparable ruler to any other of his age: Frederick the Great personified the *raison d'etat* and came to exemplify the rational use of state power for the creation of a completely new standard of responsible kingship. Let us examine in order of increasing importance the ways in which Frederick's unique sense of kingship manifested itself.

Shrewd New Strategies and New Visions of a 'Reasons of State'

*Raison d'etat*³ is an expression that was made popular by Cardinal Richelieu's *Testament Politique* (c.1640)⁴ and consists in the following crucial concept penned by him:

The public interest ought to be the sole objective of the prince and his councilors, or, at least, both are obliged to have it foremost in mind, and preferred to all private gain. It is impossible to overestimate the good which a prince and those serving him can do if they follow this principle, and one can hardly imagine the evils which befall a state if private interest is preferred to the public good and actually gains ascendancy.

(Du Plessis, 1961, p.76)

Despite Louis XIV was raised politically by Cardinal Richelieu, he quickly departed from Richelieu's principle. His policy throughout his reign was the attainment of *la gloire*, which he believed to be the duty of kings. In reality, this specious term was but an irrepressible zeal for self-aggrandizement. When he invaded Holland in 1672 he relied too heavily on his overwhelming might, without calculating the effects of his offensive to its fullest extent and not displaying much foresight of the military, political, and financial consequences for France. Undoubtedly, France was the most powerful state in Europe, yet despite its initial, devastating victories, all of Louis's gains were eventually lost by the end of his reign (Peace of Ryswick 1697, and Treaty of Utrecht 1713), and on his deathbed he blamed his bellicose

³ Friedrich Meinecke regarded Machiavelli as the inventor of 'reason of state'; but in my opinion he did not take into account that Machiavelli's implacable speculative precepts were firstly for the purpose of a ruler's supremacy—an individual ruler. The first treatise on the concept of 'reason of state' was written by Giovanni Botero (1544-1617) in his *Della Ragion di Stato* of 1589; with it, he wished to clarify a concept that had originated in Spain and that had been current throughout the second half of the sixteenth century, though it had never been systematized. Richelieu's *Raison d'Etat*, on the other hand, introduced the thoroughly modern concept of the 'public good', which resurfaced in Britain a generation later with Hobbes—in an odd mixture of tyrannical power *for* the public good—and Locke, on whom Frederick formed his political doctrine.

⁴ It was never intended for publication but as a series of principles for Louis XIII's guidance. It was probably assembled after his death (1642) in 1646 by one or more of his secretaries drawn from manuscripts and his direct dictation. The work was first published in 1688 in Amsterdam and has been contested ever since as spurious, because no fewer than seventeen manuscript copies survive, of which no two agree. After countless debates—Voltaire, too, doubted its authorship—and much research, its authenticity was definitively established in 1880, though it is acknowledged that the text is not in any sort of final form.

temperament for much of the misfortunes which had befallen France; when he drafted his instructions for his heir, his great-grandson Louis XV, the tone was a far cry from the ostentatious days when he was frenetically seeking *la gloire*: 'Always prefer peace to the hazards of war, and remember that the most brilliant victory is too dearly bought at the expense of your subjects' blood.' (Gooch, 1956, p.27)

Frederick was different. He possessed an acute practical sense, quite unequalled in his time, which was only to be found in later figures such as Metternich, Talleyrand, and then Bismarck—political men who came of age *after* the French Revolution. In a memorandum to his Foreign Minister Podewils in July 1740, he displayed an astonishing grasp of practical considerations, calculating all the possible outcomes and complications that could arise from his annexation of Silesia.

If we wait till Saxony and Bavaria start hostilities, we could not prevent the aggrandizement of the former which is wholly contrary to our interests. If we act at once, we keep her in subjection and by cutting off the supply of horses prevent her from moving. England and France are foes. If France meddles in the affairs of the Empire England could not allow it, so I can always make a good alliance with one or the other. England could not be jealous of my getting Silesia, which would do her no harm, and she needs allies. Holland will not care, all the more since the loans of the Amsterdam business world secured on Silesia will be guaranteed. If we cannot arrange with England and Holland we can certainly make a deal with France, who cannot frustrate our designs and will welcome the abasement of the Imperial house. Russia alone might cause us trouble. Next spring we shall have no one barring our path; thus if Russia wishes to attack us she may be sure she will have the Swedes on her hands and find herself between a hammer and the anvil. If the Empress lives, the Duke of Kurland, who has rich possessions in Silesia, will want me to preserve them and we can bribe the leading counselors. If she dies, the Russians will be so occupied with their domestic problems that they will have no time for foreign affairs. In any case an ass laden with gold for St. Petersburg is a possibility. All this leads to the conclusion that we must occupy Silesia before the winter and then negotiate. When we are in possession we can negotiate with success. (quoted in Gooch, 1947, p.5).

It was necessary to quote a large passage of this remarkable memorandum because it shows the very different nature of government between a ruler such as Louis XIV, who full of vainglorious and deceiving confidence just hired his best general (Condé) and rashly overran Holland, and Frederick, who before invading Silesia displayed an acumen in weighing all the choices of the course of action that is just shy of prodigious. His rationality, a gift of his age no doubt, allowed him to understand that in a Europe deeply divided, he could find allies ignoring likes or dislikes—state interest alone must decide instead. His rationality also gave him an insight into the wider significance of his actions that any other ruler would envy: 'This [Silesian campaign] is of the greatest consequence for Europe, the signal for the complete transformation of the old political system.' (quoted in Gooch, 1947, p.170)

Carving Prussia Out of the *Reich* as its New 'German' Heir

Frederick's perspicacity was just one of the differences, which made him such an effective ruler. His mighty pragmatism made him the most brilliant military commander of the century. On January 25, 1758 Cardinal de Bernis, France's new foreign minister, wrote in his diary an entry in which we can gather the complete disorganization of all the European powers: 'I agree to the interest that we have in not allowing the King of Prussia to become the dictator of Germany; but do we believe the Courts of France, Vienna, Sweden, Russia, Saxony, Bavaria, etc., remaining united, will not hold the King of Prussia more in awe than armies acting ill, badly commanded, and in no way concerting one with another?' (De Bernis, 1901, p.139) Frederick, then, we learn second hand, had the best-organized and best-led troops in Europe. In fact, Tim Blanning points out the confusion and the ill-fated arrangement of the European alliance against Prussia during the Seven Years War.

The '*renversement des alliances*' engineered by Kaunitz in 1756 may have been a diplomatic triumph, but politically it was a disaster. By allying Austria with the French hereditary enemy, it allowed Frederick to step forward as the saviour of German liberty. The traditional but still vital concept of the German nation represented by the hierarchical *Reich* now increasingly made way for a concept that was more cultural, more Prussian, more Protestant and more north German. (Blanning, 2002, p.310)

In other words, not only was Frederick holding his ground against the forces of most of continental Europe combined, he was forging a new, legitimizing identity for Prussia, which made it, for the first time in its history—and destined to be fully realized over a century later—a viable, German alternative to Austria.

The reversal of alliances that allied France together with Hapsburg Austria for the first time in over 250 years of bitter enmity, would not have occurred if d'Argenson, who was the last anti-Hapsburg Frenchman, and who became foreign minister in 1745, had not fallen in disgrace in 1755 (since, as we read earlier in his words, he believed Frederick's Prussia should have been France's friend and not its foe 'for the whole duration of his reign'). Instead, Cardinal de Bernis succeeded him and negotiated with Kaunitz, thus reversing the immemorial hostility with the Hapsburgs. De Bernis eventually became secretary for foreign affairs on 27 June 1757. To de Bernis' credit, though, it must be pointed out that he regarded the alliance with Austria as a provisional measure and never believed France should go to war next to Austria; but he was later undermined by courtly personages sympathetic to Maria Theresa.

[...] it was imperative for the French to neutralize the continent, so that they could concentrate on the all important naval and colonial theatres. As Austria was the only continental power to pose a military threat to France, an alliance would bring security. But if the French conception of the alliance was essentially defensive, the Austrians intended to use it offensively, to win back Silesia and reduce Frederick the Great's Prussia to its old rank as just another middling German state. (Blanning, 2002, p.392)

And that alliance, Blanning claims in *The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture*, was the fatal mistake of France in the eighteenth century. Frederick was content to do his duty as he saw it, to plan and labor primarily for the welfare of his state, and to place wider considerations of European balances of power as secondary. As it turned out, this was the most successful conduct: making *raison d'état* his first prerogative proved best in the context of the age. In his book on Machiavellianism, Meinecke explains that the eighteenth century was politically the most disjointed century of the modern period. In it, he claimed, the old religious and clerical forces, which had previously bound European states together had waned. At the same time, the capitalist relationships which later would bind certain states together for economic reasons were not yet in place; Mercantilism, in which each state made itself economically as self-contained as possible, still predominated. 'Never was the isolation of the power-State carried so far as in this last century of the *ancien régime* [...] and this passed over from European expediency to the special expediency of the individual States. Frederick's various interventions in European politics after 1740 accelerated this process.' (Meinecke, 1957, p.321) The same view is shared by Gooch, with a different but equally interesting slant:

That Frederick had no vision of a European system or a concert of the powers is not surprising in the eighteenth century. The medieval idea of a *Respublica Christiana* was dead and no alternative formula of unification had been found. [...] Yet he was no more a nationalist than an internationalist, for nationalism in our modern sense is the child of the French Revolution. Born into a Germany that, as Metternich said of Italy, was a mere geographical expression, he never dreamed of a nation state under a Prussian or any other German head. (Gooch, 1947, p.107).

Frederick's New Concept of Sovereignty

These remarks make Frederick's style of rule even more remarkable, because it was not supported by a utopian vision of a universally unified Europe, as for example, a figure like emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen had in the thirteenth century; Frederick the Great was content to do his duty as he saw it, to plan and labor for the welfare of *his* state alone. Meinecke also points out with great acumen that the struggles for questions of freedom, which were unleashed by the French Revolution and which split Europe into conservative and liberal camps, were still non-existent; and that thus, 'Frederick was right: the isolated States were still only knit together by the effects of their own *raison d'etat*.' (Meinecke, 1957, p.322) It is for this reason, that Meinecke appropriately refers to Frederick as both the most modern and farsighted ruler of his day and devotes to him the longest section of his book; he envisages him as the ruler who had the greatest impact on the modern principles of the state:

Frederick's mode of thinking and expressing himself ['first servant of the State'] does indicate a movement in the direction of modern thought [...] it [also] represents a movement towards the modern State, because it was Frederick's State that first created the fixed and definite form within which it was possible for a mere population to become welded together into a real people and nation with its own vital will.

(Meinecke, 1957, p.308)

By far the most important and revolutionary aspect of Frederick's kingship was his claim—and his own view of himself—that he was the 'first servant of the state'. There are numerous anecdotes, lovingly recounted by many in his day, of Frederick's unconcern for his own self—from sleeping nonchalantly on haystacks, to answering to his doctor, who demanded that Frederick rest for his own good, that 'he had his duties and the doctor his own'. But the political and historical significance of his approach are enormous, and transcend these anecdotes, which at best make him amiable to us. We have seen analyzed in detail the modernity of his stance toward rule in the European context of his day; but we can draw further instruction from Frederick's own rationalization of his role as the 'first servant of the state' in the order he gave to his minister Count Finckenstein at the outbreak of the Seven Years' War:

If it should really be my fate to be taken prisoner, then I forbid anyone to have the smallest concern for my person [...] If such misfortune should befall me I shall hold my brother, my ministers and generals, responsible with their heads for seeing that neither a province nor a ransom is offered for my release, but that the war is continued and every advantage seized, just as if I had never existed in the world.

(Meinecke, 1957, p.281)

If we compare Frederick's attitude toward kingship with that of other rulers who possessed the old ideal of personal grandeur, the difference is astonishing: when François I was captured by Charles V's army at Pavia in 1525, for example—a confrontation that Francis had provoked with his anachronistic yearning for chivalric conquests—he was brought to Spain as prisoner and did not hesitate to exchange his two sons as ransom for his release!⁵

Conclusion

Frederick's unconcern for himself was far more than astute, practical sense among outmoded kings who believed they *were* the state. For over a millennium in Europe the status of kingship possessed a peculiar sacrality, as a complex set of rituals developed around the king's person. The sacralization of the king's body was the outward manifestation of the early

⁵ This was the 'heroic' gesture of the "last chivalric King of France", as Nobert Elias called him—a man, whose own interests, to be sure, far superseded the wellbeing of his kingdom. See Nobert Elias, *The Court Society*, (1983), Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

medieval concept that the king was the state personified.⁶ Frederick despised this 'religio regis'; his view of being the 'first servant of the state' prefigured the modern politician whose office is chiefly one of service. To Frederick's great credit, he *was* King of Prussia at a time when the representational culture around kings and the high aristocracy was still very much alive, even though Jürgen Habermas has convincingly shown in his *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, that the eighteenth century witnessed a waning of the sacralization of power and of its longstanding legitimizing allegorical iconography, as it underwent a general and profound transformation toward literalism and understatement, because of the emergence of a 'public sphere', for whom allegory was uncongenial.⁷

Frederick's disregard for his dynasty in favor of his people, evident in his refusal to produce an heir of his own, his idea that 'free individuals combine to form the people of a state, and voluntarily transfer their self-determination to a ruling authority appointed by them' (Ritter, 1968, p.68), his conviction that men 'in the final analysis are equal' and that 'high birth is chimerical' (Ritter, 1968, p.68), and, once again and most of all, that he was the first servant of the state—a 'servant' with uncommon charisma, determination, and military skill, make the panegyrics quoted at the beginning of this essay utterly convincing. As Meinecke pointed out, 'who could fail to perceive the great principles [honor and interest of state] and decisions of Frederick's life?' (Meinecke, 1957, p.281)

And so, Frederick according to Ritter represented 'the apogee and at the same time the end of his epoch' (Ritter, 1968, p.175), for the collapse of the Prussian monarchy in 1806, exactly twenty years after his death, shows that a man of Frederick's caliber was still indispensable for the newest of the European powers. And yet Frederick himself, with typical political humility, wrote in his Political Testament of 1752 that 'if the destinies of any State are to be solid and sure, then its fortunes ought not to be dependent on the good or bad qualities of one man.' (quoted in Meinecke, 1957, p.338)

But with Frederick William III at the disastrous Battle of Jena-Auerstedt there was no personality or no *raison d'état* that was capable of compelling such destiny, for Frederick 'der Einzige' was indeed unique as a man, a ruler, and as an agent in Prussia's history.

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⁶ This is a complex and fascinating subject, which has a rich scholarly literature. The rituals of kingship in early modern Europe have been examined by great historians such as Ernst Kantorowicz and Marc Bloch, who produced several seminal works on the subject. For a brief yet surprisingly exhaustive study, see the excellent *The King's Body* by Sergio Bertelli (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001)

⁷ See Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, (1989) Cambridge: MIT Press.

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