

Intentional Disinformation and Freedom of Expression

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Abstract

Freedom of speech is a central human right. However, one may ask whether we can accept that intentional misinformation should be protected on the ground of human rights. Intentional disinformation has numerous forms, but the common attribute for all of them is that the sender knows this kind of information to be false. It is argued here that intentional misinformation is not knowledge as are no good reasons to believe it to be true. Thus it is not the kind of information which could be protected by human rights and therefore it cannot be protected by the principles of the freedom of speech.

Keywords: Human rights, ICT-society, freedom of speech

Introduction

World Wide Web is a huge collection of information and therefore it provides us with a unique possibility to improve level of knowledge, education and culture. With the development of information and communication technology this knowledge will be available anywhere and anytime. With the developing knowledge management technologies such as semantic web the possibilities to get right knowledge to a right place, in a right moment of time shall be substantially better than today. Simply web is an enormous opportunity for learning in the world.

However, the developments are not free from risks. One of them is disinformation. As the number of web-pages swiftly increases, the number of pages with incorrect, false, misleading and in various ways dangerous information increases also. This information is naturally problematic, because it may lead people to do something with negative consequences, which they would not otherwise do and it also decreases cyber-trust, i.e. the trust we have to the correct information.

Article 19 says that everyone has freedom of expression, the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds. In addition, everyone has right to hold opinions, which implies that information and ideas above refers also to them. Often these freedoms are also described by term freedom of speech. They apparently imply that there are no means to eliminate disinformation in WWW without acting against freedom of speech or human rights. However, there are some very natural arguments demonstrating that this is not in all cases self-evident. This means that we have to dig deeper into our intuitions about the notions of information, opinions and ideas. We have to have a clear idea about what those three things are by nature, before we can know what mean by Article 19. Only after that we can consider the issues of disinformation in the web. To begin with it is natural to start with the notion of information as the two other perceptions are obviously some type of information.

The very notion of disinformation seems to be in complex relation to the notion of information. Is it some type of information or is disinformation conceptually in contradiction the notion of information. In the latter case, it would be quite clear that article 19 would not speak about disinformation at all. However, in the former case disinformation should be protected by the principles of human rights. The key to this kind of analysis is the concept of knowledge.

Changed Roles of Information Providers and Users

Since Guttenberg, book, or more generally publication was synonym for knowledge. Author was responsible for content of the publication, providing the evidence for arguments, and finding the data source. From presentation to perception, the whole cognitive process to evaluate knowledge is represented and comprised in publication. The structure of knowledge itself is not influenced by communication function, which was to distribute the recorded knowledge to users. Until the appearance of computers, publications were the only media for knowledge exchange. Digital media and communication technologies changed records into movable texts. Information can be cumulated, modified, processed, selected and applied for new needs. Text becomes a holder of several different meanings. For author, text has one primary cognitive message, but for the user new communication value is obtained. Information becomes substantive for future usages. However, both author and the user interact with the information, and are placed to validate and interpret the signals they exchange; in cognitive information function by articulating the message and by decoding its meaning, i.e. communication value. Previous means, that information is determined by interaction and the digital media.

Internet is an example of networked interactive media. Luciano Floridi has defined the following stages of information on the Internet: creation, storage, retrieval and update (Floridi 1996). This results that usage, distribution, organization and presentation of information are crucially different from passive one-way media (W-media) or interactive two-way media (WW-media) (Floridi 1996). In WWW-media the information source and the character of authorship have changed. Author designation is determined beside the author, by the corporative author, by the website sponsor and indirectly by the Internet service provider. This means that information source is no longer only a single person or institution. In Internet, new mediators participate in the creation of information, and several participants determine the information source and authorship. Their presence in interaction with the users has changed the nature of communication.

Knowledge corpus in the Internet is continuously renovating itself, and growth of the system is not controlled, regarding number of users and information providers. Moreover, the Internet is interactive media with multiple relations among service providers, authors and users. Because the communication function, knowledge distribution and dissemination, is entirely connected with the information function, information organization and selection, it is possible for every user to become the information provider and for each author to become user. This particular feature has equalized and connected the author and the user and relocated them into participants in communication in which each of them pursue to actualize one's own interests.

This constitutes the core of the problem this paper discusses. Beside up-to-date trusted information, Internet offers also information that holds deceptions. Before bringing forth the issues of human rights and freedom of speech into the discussion, it is necessary to define the criterions for distinguishing information from misinformation and disinformation.

Information, Disinformation, Misinformation and Knowledge

Information scientist Rafael Capurro has noticed that the English word *information* carries several meanings, while there are only little references to the meaning of *misinformation*, informations' negative form. However, misinformation is derivative to "lies, propaganda, misrepresentation, gossip, delusion, hallucination, illusion, mistake, concealment, distortion, embellishment, innuendo, deception" (Capurro 2003). English word misinformation does not carry up with the intention to deceive. Instead, disinformation is intentionally mistaken information with the purpose of harming the receiver by the information provider. For example, it is used to describe the situation, where intentionally falsified information is launched by one government to another (Watson 1990). Counter information and anti-information are used as synonyms for disinformation, whereas propaganda is not disinformation and cannot be categorized even as the misinformation, though it has been sometimes included in the negative forms of information (Capurro 2003). Stair and Reynolds (2001) defined information as a "collection of facts organized in such a way that they have additional value beyond the value of facts themselves". In information science, information is considered good and valuable it must be accurate, complete, economical, flexible, reliable, verifiable, relevant, and secure. When the credibility of information is taken into discussion, valid information represents faithfully reality and should be well defined, objective and unbiased.

The pervasiveness of the Internet and the plethora of information that it provides has been extended the meanings and connotations of information. As a result of changes in communication interaction, especially the number of participants in such interaction, the risk that the integrity of information is disturbed, is increasing. In the Internet these interferences can be designated as social, technical, or semantic errors, leading to formation of information, misinformation or disinformation. The distinction between misinformation and disinformation in the Internet is crucial for example in political and advertising contexts, where sources may make deliberate efforts to mislead, deceive, or confuse the receiver in order to promote their personal, religious, or ideological objectives. The difference consists in having an agenda. It thus bears comparison with lying, because "lies" are assertions that are false, that are known to be false, and that are asserted with the intention to mislead. While misinformation can be defined as false or misleading information, disinformation entails the distribution, assertion, or dissemination of misleading information in an intentional or purposeful effort to mislead, deceive, or confuse (Fetzer 2003). The quantity and quality of disinformation can be difficult to evaluate, but there is some similarities if viewed as lying.

Information provider commits lies when he makes assertions knowing they are to be false, and with the intention to mislead. However, not all cases of false. Even false claims information provider knows to be false that are asserted deliberately do not ascend to the level of lies, when there is no intention to mislead. In the case of disinformation, the motives that tend bring about lying are displaced by other, for example political objectives.

Disinformation also occurs when available evidence that is relevant and therefore should make a difference to conclusion or hypothesis under examination is simply ignored. Evidence is relevant, when its presence or absence or its truth or falsity makes a difference to the truth or falsity of the point at issue. Rationality of belief occurs when we distribute our strength of belief in proportion to degrees of support supplied by available relevant evidence. Disinformation may often appear to violate this principle and qualify as irrationality of belief. On the other hand, insincere or corrupt forms of irrationality of belief may be displayed in exercising rationality of action as a means adequate to attain the goal. If a person cannot honestly disprove a position, perhaps he can manage with it by suppressing it. In that case,

disinformation might be characterized as incompetence by someone assuming the task of offering a critique when it is one that he is not well-positioned to provide. This may be due to any number of factors, including lack of familiarity of facts or misunderstandings.

Precisely because the definition of disinformation implies the intent to deceive, its usage can provoke controversy. Disinformation can be viewed as carefully contrived misinformation prepared by the provider for the purpose of misleading, deluding, disrupting, or undermining confidence in individuals, organizations, or governments (Carl 1990). A more discriminating definition has been advanced that separates the source from agenda. Disinformation deliberates differentiation of unreliable information by persons who receive compensation but who have a specific agenda to counter truth. To call someone distributor of disinformation implicates both information provider and providers' objectives. Therefore, misinformation can be false information disseminated without an agenda by those who are either unfamiliar with the evidence or cognitively impaired. With regard to the debate, there are differences in comprehension. This may be the result of someone being misinformed, usually an innocent occurrence, but can also be the result of disinformation – the misrepresentation of true facts or deliberate dissemination of known false material. These conceptions appear in everyday situations, where dominant economic forces, like global corporations, may have powerful financial incentives to provide false depictions of their actions.

Information is not knowledge. Knowledge has three criterions. Firstly, a person must believe that the piece of information is true, the piece of information must be true and most importantly, person must have good grounds to believe that the piece of information is true. Only, if these three criteria are filled we can say that a person knows the particular piece of knowledge. Obviously, all information is not knowledge but there is much untrue information or disinformation. Thinking article 19, there should not be any reason to say that a person would not have right to false opinions. Even the most genial people of past times have had much disinformation in their minds.

However, we have to divide the notion of disinformation into two categories. We have non-intentional or accidental disinformation, which is correct in the opinion of the provider but factually incorrect and intentional disinformation, which means that the person, who presents the piece of information, knows that the given information is false. The concentration here is on intentional disinformation (IDI). Accidental disinformation

(ADI), misinformation means simply false opinion and any human being must have right to have false opinions and all of us have well enough them.

Intentional disinformation in the web is a complex problem and to make the notion concrete it is good to provide some concrete examples:

1) Human rights violating disinformation:

a. Propaganda for war

Disinformation is mostly commonly described as false information created by governments in wartime for military purposes, and by governments for political purposes in peaceful times.

b. Racial or religious hatred

Singular example of this type of disinformation is the anti-Semitic article that was first published in *Das Reich*, 28 February 1943 when the Nazis were building up to major anti-Semitic and anti-Soviet propaganda campaigns.

2) Expert disinformation

a. Expert without arguments against true knowledge in the field

For example controversial, potentially harmful conversion, or sexual reorientation therapies practiced by organizations that partners with fundamental religious groups (Domenici 1995; Yoshino 2002). The American Psychiatric Association (APA) stated in 2000 that as a general principle, a therapist should not determine the goal of treatment (APA 2000).

b. Expert uses authority without true knowledge of the particular issue

See 2 a).

c. Malpractice

For example, medical malpractice refers professional negligence by act or omission by a health care provider in which care provided deviates from accepted standards of practice in the medical community and causes injury or death to the patient (e.g. US medical malpractice

reports by the National Practitioner Databank demonstrating the reported medical malpractices, NPDB 2006).

3) Charlatanistic information

a. Person claims to be expert, when he or she is not

The usual examples of charlatanistic information are cases where a person has been practicing a profession, such as teacher or medical doctor without any proper education.

b. Person implying to be expert

See 3 a).

4) State provided disinformation

a. Falsified statistics or manipulation of scientific studies

According to a recent publication of the US House of Representatives, there are numerous instances where the Bush Administration has manipulated the scientific progress and distorted or suppressed scientific findings, for example according to the report, the areas where disinformation are spread are e.g. global warming, missile defense, stem-cell research, and abstinence education. The means of disinformation that is used include for example pointing unqualified and biased personnel as advisors and into scientific committees (Check 2003; Nature Editorial 2003; Brumfield 2004).

b. Knowingly incorrect knowledge about how things are in the state

An example of incorrect knowledge of how things are is the case when Israeli forces attacked a flotilla of aid-carrying ships aiming to break the country's siege on Gaza violating international laws. Israel didn't allow objective investigation concerning the incident but instead, executed one by itself. According to diplomatic sources the report concerning the attack prepared by an Israeli committee seemed to be a well-prepared at first but however, the report lacks the names of persons whose views were resorted and legal contents, for example (Turkish Weekly 2011).

5) Political disinformation

a. Incorrect information for persuasive goals on political level

See 4 a).

b. Hiding true reasons for planned actions

See 4 a).

6) Terrorist information

This kind of disinformation may be for example treat announcements in order to provoke panic. On the other hand, disinformation about the terrorist groups' target population can be used as justification of action.

7) Commercial disinformation

a. Information about the properties of products they do not have

This type of disinformation is notified to appear in the information of the effects of cosmetic products.

b. Knowing that product is unsafe or improper but falsely denying this

Councillors from Japan's whaling industry have revealed that schoolchildren have been served dolphin meat containing dangerous levels of mercury, prompting warnings of a potential public health disaster as the country attempts to boost consumption of cetacean meat. Although the councillors say they do not oppose traditional whale and dolphin hunting, they have been shunned by fellow assembly members since going public with their findings (McCurry 2007).

8) Organizational disinformation

a. Providing incorrect information for the stakeholders about the state of affairs

For example Enron case: Enron's traders helped to build up the scenario by publishing press releases about trade deals that did not actually were executed. The corporation went bankrupt as a result of committing systematic accounting fraud. The problem in this set-up scenario was that real money came in from investors, but there was no actual money coming in from real revenues that were results of accounting manipulations.

b. Providing false information to employees and shareholders

As a one of the results of Enron scandal, employees and shareholders received limited returns in lawsuits, despite losing billions in pensions and stock prices. As another consequence of

the scandal, new regulations and legislation were enacted to expand the accuracy of financial reporting for public companies (Ayala & Ibárruen 2006).

c. Providing disinformation to workmates or about workmates

9) Sexual disinformation

a. Propagating for inhuman sexual practices

This type of disinformation concerns some parts of pornographic materials, for example. Pornography issue is not merely moral problem. It is considered as unethical and is considered as the source to various societal problems, such as STDs, sexual harassment against women, sexual violence and pedophilia. However, in terms of liberty of pornography distribution, form of regulations may differ from one country to another and even the most democratic country still regulates pornography. What becomes to the issue that moral should not be regulated by the country is flawed. The Universal Declaration of human right (article 29) state, the limitation against freedom of expression can be done on the basis of moral consideration in a democratic society.

b. Propagating for damaging sexual practices

For example, sex-education when refusing to include information about birth control in such education, or offering abstinence instead of condoms to be solution in preventing spreading of HIV. Studies do not indicate that abstinence only interventions effectively decrease or exacerbate HIV risk among participants in high-income countries (Underhill et al. 2007). However, some reviews of abstinence based programs suggest factual inaccuracies (e.g. SIECUS 2008).

10) Violence provoking disinformation

a. Propagating for violent social behavioral patterns

For example disinformation campaign for provoking violent behavior, for example currently in Libya.

b. Propagating for violent and irrational individual behavioral patterns

see 10 a.

11) Technical disinformation

a. Viruses, spams or other harmful programs

The example of this type of disinformation is Stuxnet worm that was targeted high value infrastructure in Iran (Fildes, 2010).

12) Self-disinformation

Person provides false information about him/herself, for example pretending to be younger or older instead of informing his or her true age. This type appears most likely in social mass media and it is specifically harmful when used in criminal purposes.

It is possible to find numerous additional types of intentional disinformation. Nevertheless, the main topic is the conceptual logic of 19th article in UN declaration of human rights and this is why the provided examples should give a view to some types and the nature of intentional disinformation in the web.

Obviously the concept *disinformation* holds different contents in philosophical and information science contexts. However, intentionality can be indicated to be a key factor when evaluating disinformation's ethical disposition.

Philosophical View on Intentionality

The term intentionality was introduced widely in analytical and continental philosophy by Edmund Husserl. Jean-Paul Sartre connected intentionality to consciousness as inseparable from each others in his writing *Being and Nothingness* (1943/2003), which is undisputed opposite to Brentons' view where intentionality is only one mental attribute of mental phenomenon. Some philosophies, like A.J. Ayer and Gilbert Ryle has criticized Husserls' view. According to Ryle, perception is not a process (Ryle 1949). Ayer describing one's knowledge is not to describe mental processes (Hardy 1992). However, traditionally in scholastic philosophy, the term intentionality indicates to the consciousness' ability to refer outside from itself, being *about* of something else. Later Jeremy Bentham introduced the term

intentionality as a quality of consciousness, for the purpose of distinguishing acts that are intentional and acts that are not (Brentano 1874). Intentionality is also used within philosophy of mind, as a term that emphasizes the differences between states of consciousness and physical states. Later Husserl proposed that consciousness is always intentional; concept was undertaken in connection with theses set forth by Franz Brentano regarding the psychological and ontological status of objects of thought (Husserl 1931). In Oxford English Dictionary intentionality is defined "the distinguishing property of mental phenomena of being necessarily directed upon an object, whether real or imaginary" (Chrisholm 1967). Its previous meaning and in the usage of Husserl, the term is primarily used in contemporary philosophy, where it appears in phenomenology, existentialism, and in analytical philosophy. Within the views, where consciousness' strong independent nature is emphasized, like in Cartesian Dualism, accent intentionality as a quality of thought (Chrisholm 1963; 1967).

Every mental action has always a content that direct towards an (intentional) object. For example, wants or beliefs always direct towards particular object: want is always want for *something* and believing is always believe in *something*. *Intentional inexistence* describes the state of thoughts' object (Brentano 1995; Sajama & Kamppinen 1987). This feature of intentionality, meaning possession of the intentional object, is a fundamental difference between mental and physical phenomenon. Physical phenomenon does not have intentionality. According to Brentano, the definition of intentionality includes 1) relation to the content, 2) direction towards object, and 3) immanent objectivity (Brentano 1874). Roderick Chrisholm has separated Brentanos' concept into ontological and psychological aspects, separating the language that describes the psychological phenomenon from language that describes non-psychological phenomenon. In Chrisholms' view (Chrisholm 1963; Hahn 1997), the criterions to usage of intentional sentences are 1) independent existence, 2) indifferent truth value, and 3) opaque of allusions.

Intentional Action

The classical studies of children's understanding of intentional actions have shown that preschool children are able to distinguish various kinds of actions, for example successful, accidental, and unsuccessful (e.g. Piaget 1932). In other studies, children were asked questions about the goals and intentions of observed actions (e.g. Baird & Moses 2001; Shultz & Wells 1985). Now the focus has shifted to whether children distinguish desires from intentions. According to general findings, they can do that distinction in their explicit language from about 5 years of age (e.g. Feinfeld et al. 1999; Schult 2002). There are also studies, in which preschool-age children talk about artwork in terms of the intentions of artists or producer (e.g. Bloom & Markson 1998).

If we want to understand intentional action, we must have a model what intentional action is. The simple model of causal relations (Bhaskar 1979) where goal, action, and perceptual observance are components in adjustable system that serves to regulate individuals' interactions. According to cyberneticians like N. Weiner (1948) and W.R. Ashby (1956), machines acting on their own (intelligently) have the same basic organization including same components, than humans: 1) goal, in which the action is directed, 2) the ability to act in order to change the environment, and 3) the ability to perceive the environment for knowing, when the changed state in environment matches the goal.

For understanding intentional action, distinction must be made between goal and intention. Intention is an action plan the individual chooses and commits in order to pursuit particular goal (Bratman 1989). Intention includes both means and a goal. The notion that intention includes both, explains why exactly same action may be considered different intentionally. When individual chooses an intended course of action, both knowledge and its mental model are consulted of the relevant aspects of current situation – and that are relevant achieving the goal. The chosen action is rational in the sense it intensively adapts individuals' skills, knowledge and model of current situation. Individual's intention results in behavioral action. After the action is performed, the state of reality is transformed. This is the result of action,

which may or may not correspond to the goal. Attempt may be failed, an accident, or success. The result can also be intended or unintended, and conscious or subliminal (Bhaskar 1979). Obligatory to the process is finally individuals' perceptual observance, where an individual observes the situations in order to perceive the state of current reality, whether it executed the intended action, and the result of action. However, attention may be selective, thus be thought as intentional perception (e.g. Tomasello 1995). This process finalizes the position of intentional action. The individual acts for bringing reality, as he or she perceives it, into parallel with his or hers goals.

W. Powers (1973) stress the importance to recognize the hierarchical structure involved. When individual chooses an action plan to set forth in intentional action, it also must create lower-level action plans and goals. At each level there are several possibilities to choose from, which must be evaluated with respect to their predicted efficacy. Generally, when viewed from beneath is a goal, and means when viewed above. Regarding this, when moving towards more general goals explains why an individual has this particular goal. Moving down the hierarchy to more specific action plans clarifies how a goal is achieved as for intentional actions.

Causes for intentional action are causal reasons of intentional actions (reasons as causes) (Bashkar 1979). In summary, intentional action requires:

1. *An agent* who holds the causal power (capacities, abilities, dispositions, preparedness, willingness).
2. *Human agency*, i.e. individuals' specific emergent causal powers (ability to learn and use the language and capacity to observe consciously his or hers own, or others' actions).
3. *Intentional action*, i.e. the execution of human action towards a certain goal.
4. *Reason for intentional action*, i.e. belief that is typically entrenched in the interests, possibilities and limitations of practical life, and concerns the particular goal, and the means for achieving that goal (physical environment, social practices and positions).
5. *Activated reason of intentional action*, i.e. want and desire to obtain particular goal. (Archer 2000, 2003; Bashkar 1979). The causes of action are analogical with causal mechanisms of non-human nature. If these reasons were not causal reasons for intentional action, communication would be impossible (e.g. Archer 2003; Bashkar 1979). However, according to the argument of logical relation and the critics against the causal interpretation of causes, the descriptions of causal reasons must be conceptually independent from the descriptions of its results (e.g. von Wright 1971). Contrary to the descriptions of natures' causal reasons, descriptions of intentional action are not logically independent from the descriptions of actions causes they are supposed to explain (e.g. von Wright). Description for intentional action can usually be presented which is logically independent from the causes of that particular action. Actors' activated causes of action must be taken into account in explaining intentional action, because those causes affect causally. However, individuals does not usually are aware of all motives behind their action (e.g. Bhaskar 1979; 1986). Therefore, in causal explanation of intentional action, mere interpretation of actors' causes and significations is not enough, but it also requires criticizing actors' perceptions.

Conceptual Structure of Disinformation

The main question to ask is whether intentional disinformation is protected by human rights. Is it really different from accidental disinformation, which is naturally protected by human rights? If we return to the definition of knowledge which has been universally accepted at least since Plato, the first condition says that people have a piece of knowledge (PK) if they believe that PK is the case. This is naturally, the crucial difference between accidental and intentional disinformation. However, it is also a difference between opinion and something else. Intentional disinformation is not an opinion of the imparting person. This naturally means that we need not think that human rights protecting opinions would be violated by discarding intentional misinformation or at least its most problematic types from the net while

deleting accidental disinformation would certainly be a violation of human rights and the freedom of speech.

The problems with the notion of opinions are now clearer. Intentional disinformation cannot be an opinion. The problems with the notions of information and ideas can be solved in another manner. Intentional disinformation obviously seems to be some kind of information or idea and article 19 supports imparting information and ideas of all kinds. Why intentional disinformation would not be protected by human rights, as it seems to be combined of information and of ideas of some kind. However, this conception is very probably incorrect, because intentional disinformation entails neither genuine information nor ideas.

Information is representation and stands for something. It may accidentally misrepresent the reference and we do not know this. However, about intentional disinformation is known *on good grounds* in the moment of impartment that it does not have a reference. Therefore, it is not genuine information and does not entail genuine ideas but it is only pseudo-information. It has been necessary to make in science a difference between pseudo-science and genuine science in the thirties and it seems that it is necessary thanks to web make also a difference between pseudo-information and genuine information. Intentional disinformation is always pseudo-information and entails pseudo-ideas. They have no possibility to be true, because they have been intentionally selected on the ground that they are false. Consequently, one cannot claim that article 19 would justify freedom for imparting intentional disinformation.

In fact, imparting intentional disinformation itself can be seen as a violation of human rights. Article 1 declares in the Universal declaration of human rights (1948) give people the ethical duties; all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. Naturally, intentional disinformation is in contradiction with spirit of brotherhood and conscience. In principle, there are thus clear human rights grounds to discard intentional disinformation of all kinds in web. Intentional disinformation is not only pseudo-information but also against human rights.

The issues of intentional disinformation have many practical dimensions as human rights issues often have. It is not always clear what disinformation is intentional and what is a genuine opinion. However, this is not always problem. It is possible to prove in many cases that some piece of information is false. In these cases, accidental disinformation can be corrected on the ground of arguments. Intentional disinformation has other goals and it may be problematic how it can be corrected. Nevertheless, coping with intentional disinformation is not totally alien to human practices. In courts people, intentional activities must often be separated from accidental ones. So it is presumably not impossible to cope with problems of intentional disinformation in many cases. In courts it is also common that the truth of a story is assessed on the ground of the information they add or leave out from the actual course of actions. This way of thinking naturally applies to intentional disinformation. The main thing is that we need not take intentional disinformation as opinion, idea or genuine information at all.

Finally, there are naturally practical cases in which information is consciously falsified or omitted on good grounds. This may be rational or irrational, but this way of behaving does not any more belong to the sphere of the freedom of speech. It depends on the grounds, whether it has been wise or not. Freedom of speech can hardly be used to justify any type of intentional disinformation.

Discussion

The practical actions in case of intentional disinformation should be coded to human rights legislation. There are two important ways to reach to intentional disinformation. Firstly, it should be possible to take intentional disinformation out. This is especially important, when information is about some individual or group of people. Secondly, the identity of people who spread intentional disinformation should be give at least to the target persons and the motives

should be clarified. People should have right to protect themselves against intentional disinformation.

The logic of our analysis is clear: Intentional disinformation cannot be protected on the ground of freedom of expression or speech. As a matter of fact, freedom of speech has never been unlimited. For example, it cannot be used to protect another person's religious opinions. From this point of view, it is not exceptional that intentional disinformation would be closed outside freedom of expression. There are cases of intentional disinformation, which are necessary. For example, medical doctors may understate the risks in operations to get patients to take right course of acting, or military may provide false information about the situations in warfare. The critical line in intentional disinformation could be harming other people. Assuming that given information harms a human being's conditions of life, it should be possible for the target person to prevent presenting this kind of information publicly.

There are means to eliminate intentional disinformation. Firstly the service providers should take this kind of information away from their servers. Indeed, there should be a light method for doing this. Secondly, the target person should have right to get the name of the people who have presented false information. This means that the people who provide or spread intentional disinformation should be made responsible for their behavior and possible damages they cause to others. This is acceptable social practice in the life outside internet. It is strange that internet society would not follow the normal practices and ethical norms in society.

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